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The CRCs' US antecedents, Industry-University Cooperative Research Centers (IUCRC) have been in place since the late 1970s (Cohen et al. 1994) . These collaborative structures have been complemented by the Engineering Research Centres (ERCs) and the Science and Technology Centres (STCs). All are directed in one way or another towards enhancing technology transfer (Steenhuis and Gray, 2006) . Like the Australian model these centres, apart from their potential contributions to technology transfer, carry implications for organizational management. Steenhuis and Gray have drawn attention to the various organizational strategies adopted by these US centres.
The importance, organizational complexity, financial scale and potentially far reaching implications of these research organizations necessitate an emphasis on the management systems and structures of STCs (Steenhuis and Gray, 2006, p. 58) . Steenhuis and Gray's findings (2006, pp.74-76) suggest a wide variation in management strategies between centres. This could be because optimal organizational management models are still evolving, or the nature of centres is so varied that strategic management models will always be somewhat heterogeneous. They suggest, however, that variation in strategies emerges because cooperative research centres are not in competition with other such centres but are acting as intermediaries between academic research interests and the technology interests of the commercial partners.
Although they may in practical terms be operating as intermediaries, the partner organizations -universities, public research institutes and firms -that make up these triple helix entities are in highly competitive environments. Universities compete with each other for students, staff, research income and academic kudos.
Research institutes also compete for scientific staff, for external research funding, for treasury budget allocations and government contracts. Industry partners are in a commercially competitive environment, but also compete for scientific staff and the intellectual property rewards this can bring. Moreover, as we have documented elsewhere, collaborative research centres are also in competition with the departmental organizational structures that exist within their partner universities (Garrett-Jones et al 2005a) . This has implications for the career options for research personnel. There are potential rewards such as access to new equipment and to be working with leading-edge scientists. There are also potential risks for scientists that their work and consequently careers may be driven in unintended directions by their CRC involvement. As CRC researchers seek to resolve tension between potential rewards and risks there are also implications for the partner organizations. This is because linking their career options more directly to a CRC is often achieved by reducing commitment to the partner organization that employs them.
Managing CRCs
A wide range of apparently successful management structures have evolved across the 
Critical Issues in the Literature
There is a large body of literature on cross-sector R&D collaboration that seeks to explain how CRC-type organizations have evolved and how they can best be managed. Three enduring research themes within this literature are of direct relevance to our interests in this article. These are: (1) explaining how the competing goals and expectations of partners can be integrated within a single collaborative centre; (2) explaining how trust is (or is not) generated and the implications this has for how partners interact with and treat each other; and (3) explaining how the careers of scientists might change through the choices they have within CRCs.
Synthesising Competing and Complementary Goals
According to Lee (2000) It is necessary then to consider first what is regarded as legitimate competition, collaboration, ownership and reward (Gibbons et al., 1994) , and second how objectives and strategies are defined and implemented (Steenhuis and Gray, 2006) .
This raises the question of what appropriate balance between trust and 'formal government' (Menard, 2004 ) is required to coordinate cross-sector R&D
organizations, and what form of 'governance' and rules are accepted and enforced.
Much of the debate around this issue concerns the differing expectations of CRC partner organizations and how this can best be managed. We are concerned here equally with the expectations of the research personnel who constitute the CRC but who have concurrent employment commitments to partner organizations.
Building Trust between Partners
Although CRCs are formal structures, they remain to some extent 'virtual centres'.
Researchers, funding and projects come and go -bringing with them organizational allegiances, expectations and commitments -and taking them with them if they leave. Holland and Lockett (1998, p. 606) describe the coalescence of virtual organizations around outcomes, and the need to deal with the risk that the outcome may not be achieved: 'there is a significant level of risk associated with the outcome… and organizational trust has been hypothesized to be an explanatory variable for the development of such cooperative behaviour'. For Daellenbach and Davenport (2004, p. 189 ) 'this reflects the expectation that partners will act competently and recognize and protect the interests of other alliance members'.
In a voluntary alliance like a CRC the participant organizations and individuals expect to be involved in decision-making and to be 'justly' treated if they are to remain a member. Daellenbach and Davenport (2004) assess the role of distributive justice (fair allocation of outcomes and rewards) and procedural justice (fair handling of processes, such as decision making, agreement on procedural norms, conflict resolution and governance) in the establishment of technology alliances involving firms and public sector research institutes. They note that how these elements of governance are dealt with is crucial to building trust within the collaboration.
Academic science is built on trust in the quality and validity of research performed. This is ensured through public sharing of knowledge (Liebeskind and Oliver, 1998) . However, in the context of cross-sector R&D, this raises the questions of how partner organizations from each of the three sectors and the research personnel are selected in the first place (Daellenbach and Davenport, 2004 ).
Nooteboom (2000) deals with this issue by distinguishing between two elements of trust: competence (or the capability to deliver the agreed outcomes) and intention (the degree to which parties are committed to the avowed goals and avoid opportunism -that is, putting self-interest above the goals of the centre). But for us, trust is a very personal measure. Organizational trust emerges only to the extent that its members trust the members of another organization. This further directs our analysis to the experiences and expectations of the research personnel. How do individual participants assess trust and reputation (and its breach), how is trust built and how do they respond when faced with opportunist behaviour?
Career choices and balancing reward and risk
Several studies have examined the value of participation in cross-sector R&D centres for business participants (Adams et al., 2001; Feller et al., 2002) . Industry perspectives from our present study are reported elsewhere (Couchman and Fulop, 2004) . For business partners rewards are generally tangible and well articulated, such as acquiring new intellectual property, developing a new product or solving a problem in production. For individual public sector researchers rewards may be less tangible such as extensions to research networks and access to new ideas and new research problems. But they are just as important for weighing up employment career options.
As Lee (2000) points out, university researchers would not engage with industry unless they felt that the collaboration brought them significant and important benefits.
But for research personnel we would expect a greater degree of intangible benefit than for business partners.
Lee's survey of 427 faculty members in US universities who were engaged in R&D projects with industry showed a range of motives for collaborating with industry. Among the benefits he identifies for university researchers are: funding for research and scholarships, insight through practical application of research, experience relevant to teaching, job placement or business opportunities, and furthering the mission of the university. The material benefits of funding for research staff or equipment were most highly regarded, as were the intangible benefits relating to gaining insight into ones own research and testing applications of theory.
Expectations were generally realized as benefits in Lee's study: a majority of faculty members experienced 'substantial and considerable benefits to their academic research dimension' (p. 121). Other motivations such as seeking entrepreneurship, jobs for their students, or furthering the university's mission were not nearly as important to them. This finding, however, is somewhat puzzling as it runs counter to the growing body of literature showing that scientists make career choices because of the more intangible benefits such as enhancing science networks, kudos and testing new ideas (Turpin et al, 2008) . It may reflect national differences in institutional research funding mechanisms.
Recent work by Dietz and Bozeman (2005) ' (2006, p. 76) . Secondly, in the USA, the development of strategic plans is driven by different management approaches. In the case of IURCs they are driven largely by external groups. In the case of ERCs they are driven by creative leaders, and in the case of STCs, by management teams. In contrast, in typical university research centres the strategic plan is driven by an individual or group of faculty members. Thus Steenhuis and Gray argue that it is the nature of the program with its specific technological and commercial objectives that attract specific drivers for strategy.
All of the critical he issues discussed above deal in one way or another with ambivalence surrounding choices about working in CRCs. At an organizational level choices are made about shoring up institutional credentials, about investing financial and human resources and about pressing for certain strategic directions to gain return from these investments. At an individual level choices are made about setting research priorities, applying for grants, preparing publications and maximising options for future employment and careers. In making choices about their careers research personnel will the consider strength of their allegiances to various partner organizations within the CRCs. We are interested to know how individuals make these choices, about the implications for the partner organizations and for the sustainability of the CRC as an enduring organizational structure. At a broader level we believe this analysis can inform the proposition presented by Dietz and Bozeman (2005) that academic careers are changing in some fundamental way.
The Role of Government in CRCs
Government Recently, a national review of the Australian CRC program has recommended a move towards broader public good outcomes and translating investments into social and environmental benefit as well as economic benefit. The review also calls for a stronger focus on delivering end-user benefits rather than being directly involved in commercialization, and encourages greater flexibility in strategic directions (O'Kane, 2008) . This ebb and flow of government expectations between commercial or public good priorities carries implications for those within CRCs. As program objectives shift so too will the expectations, career options and allegiances among the personnel involved in the centres.
CRCs in Australia differ from programs like the US Engineering Research
Centres in covering a broader spectrum of research; in having more the character of 'virtual institutes' (researchers largely remain employed by their 'home' organization, not by CRC itself); and in many cases (despite an original intention of research concentration) by being widely distributed geographically across Australia.
Effectively, they combine the objectives of all three US Centres programs described above. Thus the Australian centres are more heterogeneous in their objectives and contexts (and potentially -following Steenhuis and Gray -in their structure) than, say, the US IUCRCs or ERCs. We therefore expected to find a greater degree of variation in the way Australian CRC research personnel are motivated to join CRCs and subsequently balanced opportunities for reward with potential risk, than in the studies reported elsewhere.
Methodology
Our empirical evidence is drawn from a survey of 370 respondents from show considerable consistency in explaining why research personnel join CRCs but considerable differences in the nature of concerns about remaining in the CRC collaborative environment.
Rewards and Risk in CRC participation

The issue of goals
The first theme concerns the goals and expectations of the Australian researchers.
Respondents to the survey provided a strong endorsement of the benefits of participation in the CRCs. An overwhelming majority expressed pride in their CRC membership (see Table 1 , proposition C1) saw it as complementing their other professional work (C4), and enhancing collaboration (C3). A majority also valued the effect of the CRC on the cohesion of their research team (C2), and as an avenue for technology development that was not otherwise available (C10). Nearly half of the respondents felt that the CRC's impact on improved project management was beneficial (D5). More tangibly a majority viewed the CRC Program as an important source of research funds (C7) and (for a substantial minority of respondents) the CRCs provided access to essential research facilities in other organizations (C6).
Academic (HE) and government research (GR) respondents differed
significantly on two propositions. HE respondents rated professional and administrative support from the CRC as more important than did GR respondents.
Further, while both agreed with the proposition that the CRC complemented their professional activities (C4), there was a significant difference in the distribution of responses with the HE respondents being less unanimous in their agreement. We explain these differing responses as reflecting a the more integrated management style typical of public research institutes on the one hand, with those more usually experienced in the university sector.
In the open-ended questions, respondents nominated both material and (OT-140). In short, many respondents saw a significant cost in not being part of a CRC as it provided an otherwise missing element to their 'scientific context', including application of their research.
The Australian respondents placed less import on the material benefit of funding (compared to Lee's US study), probably because research funding in
Australian universities (and of course in government labs, which were not surveyed by Lee) is not as wholly dependent on direct grants as are US universities. In particular, our findings strongly endorse Lee's comment that:
First and foremost, faculty members who participate in industry-sponsored research have their own research agendas … The most important motivational consideration for them is to complement their academic research agenda. (Lee, 2000, pp. 120-1) We argue that the extent of consistency in the nature of anticipated reward is an important factor that can underpin the organizational durability of the CRC model.
Our survey also explored a range of propositions about potential problems with membership of a CRC. These included issues such as short-term research objectives or a lack of intellectual challenge in industry-related projects, publication restrictions, isolation from other colleagues who were not in the CRC, distortion of organizational goals or a disjunction between reward systems, and lack of adequate return on investment. Unlike the consensus we found on benefits, there was no widespread agreement by respondents on the problems and risks of participation in CRCs.
A minority of respondents felt any conflict between their 'home' employment and the demands of the CRC (D8); that their institutions was subsidising their involvement in the CRC (D7); that there was a degree of 'lock-in' to the CRC projects which might restrict an appropriate change of direction by participants (D9); or that industry participants were too intent on short-term objectives (D3).
In contrast, another set of possible issues was rejected as important by around half of the respondents and supported by only a small minority. CRC participation had not reduced the respondents' interaction with other students and research staff (F10); nor had the CRC distorted their organization's research priorities (D11) nor led to undue competition with their 'home' colleagues (D10)). In particular, the proposition that industry projects lacked challenge (D4) was strongly rejected. Responses to other questions on scholarly publication and limiting opportunities for fundamental research (not shown in Table 1 ) were more equivocal, suggesting that these issues were significant for some participants.
What this tells us is that there are no overriding problems in the organization arrangements and management of the CRCs, but that particular issues are important or even crucial for some participants. For example only a small minority of respondents agreed that the CRC had any positive effect on their gaining research council grants (a critical issue for academic researchers) (F12), and over half of the respondents to the question disagreed/strongly disagreed. This was the third question where the responses of the higher education (HE) and government researchers (GR) differed significantly. Further, the HE group slightly disagreed that CRC participation had increased their opportunities for scholarly publication. This leads us to suggest that some HE researchers are experiencing difficulty in reconciling their role within the CRC with the drivers of career advancement in the university and success in peer reviewed academic research council grants (Garrett-Jones et al., 2005b) .
The issue of trust
Our second theme concerns the role of trust in respect of the scientific programs and governance of the CRC. While scientific opportunities were the main motivating factors it was threatened curtailment of these opportunities that were perceived as major risks. Comments made in response to the open-ended questions in the survey showed that respondents potentially regard as negative anything -like publication restrictions -which impinged on their research activity and output.
Trusting administrative procedures
Managing a complex interorganizational network such as a CRC carries substantial overheads. While we received an equivocal response to the question about whether
CRCs were 'too bureaucratic' many respondents regarded administrative overheads as both unnecessary and as more onerous than with alternative forms of research support.
'Transaction costs are very high' (GR-230) was a typical response when asked about problems with the management of the CRC. Others commented: 'more forms, more paperwork, more reviews' (GR-125); 'there is a large administrative cost linking different institutions' (HE-141); 'I was frustrated by how cumbersome the CRC was'
(GR-100); and 'dual reporting needs' (GO-164). 'Compared to an ARC grant, a CRC has a much greater administrative cost and suffers from the possibility that the funds can be altered through the life of a project' said one academic (HE-141).
We were interested to explore this issue further and to explain why this was so strongly felt. First, respondents saw little benefit flowing back to themselves or their research groups: 'unnecessary forms, timesheets etc. with no management feedback even to project leaders; so seems pointless' (HE-121). Second, the politicking and management distracted them from their main concern of carrying out research:
'massive percentage of funds spent on administration rather than research' (HE-335);
'the CRC reporting requirements strongly impinge on research time and activities' (HE-3). Other comments included: 'too much money spent on "organization" -meetings etc… Not enough for research. CRCs should be about research' (HE-200);
or the 'focus is not on research' (HE-254). Ultimately, this could lead to frustration and individual reaction:
'my attempts to maintain an external collaboration tore me apart (double management reporting presentation etc) so much that I am leaving this job with the CRC to take a regular funded position overseas with clean and simple funding provided + 30% salary increase' (HE-52).
In short, there appears little trust in the potential of what are described as burdensome administrative procedures to deliver benefit to the researcher or research project.
Although CRCs are not 'cooperatives' in the sense of being member-based, democratically controlled organizations they start this way, by recruiting voluntary participants in the bid for grant funding. We found that this cooperative thinking permeates the participants' continuing expectations. The majority of respondents agreed on the importance of fully representative governance for the CRC (E6), while acknowledging the roles of the CEO and board members in the CRC's success (E5 and E7). In contrast only a minority 'agreed/strongly agreed' that their views were adequately represented on the CRC governing boards (D13) or that they had enough influence over decisions by the CRC (D12). Indeed, a substantial minority of respondents 'disagreed/strongly disagreed' that they had an adequate say. Comments we received showed that the respondents expect a strong voice in the strategy and running of the CRC and that they were unhappy when they were not consulted and involved: 'I do not have much say in the affairs of CRC. I know I have the capacity to contribute more but no takers' (GR-31). ' We get told what to do!' (HE-264). This suggests that a desire for organization 'engagement' is frustrated by limited trust that such engagement is achievable.
Trusting scientific credibility
Respondents' comments showed that trust between partners in the CRC is expressed both in terms of scientific competence (ability) and commitment or intention (integrity/benevolence). Competence expressed itself particularly in respondents'
assessment of the quality of the researchers in the collaboration: 'this can result in a lot of "B grade" researchers doing quite limited work' (HE-7); or 'company members supply their second-level staff' (HE-121). They were critical of the CRC failing to enrol the best researchers:
The university with the most knowledge may not necessarily be working on the project. Who is doing the work is more likely to be the uni that initiates the proposal (GO-37).
Failings by other partners resulting in 'competition at the expense of collaboration'
(HE-199) were generally interpreted in terms of the party's self-interest and lack of commitment, rather than their incapacity: 'some institutions are NOT "cooperative" ' said one (HE-253); 'certain individuals from other academic institutions [forget] that the first "C" stands for cooperative . Others commented on the 'failure of some researchers to collaborate openly and fairly' (HE-386). The above comments suggest a concern that the partners are delivering 'their best'. Respondents lost faith in their partners when they were: (1) viewed as poor quality researchers, (2) viewed as incapable of delivering knowledge, results or feedback, or (3) seemed to lack commitment to the ethos of cooperation or were perceived to be pursuing their own ends. Two factors commonly mentioned that led to this lack of trust were: (1) inadequate commitment of resources (usually people and money) -either actual or perceived (or unverifiable), and (2) domination of or undue influence on the direction of the collaboration or of the potential rewards. The way that CRCs were structured made it difficult for partners to assess whether each other was 'pulling their weight':
'costing models between partners are wildly different and project budgeting is a major source of mistrust' (GR-96) said one government researcher. Reneging on commitments was also viewed seriously by an academic respondent: 'ensuring inkind contributions match commitments' (HE-184); 'commitment of individual staff is low … and over-ridden by host institution priorities' (HE-89). 'Inflexible and one-sided IP arrangements' (GR-123) were also viewed with distrust as a form of selfinterest.
The issue of trust as expressed in the experiences of our CRC research personnel reflects the two dimensions of trust elaborated by Nooteboom (2000) :
competence and intention. But the findings discussed above suggest both are directed at partner organizations, rather than individuals. The concerns are about who they deliver, the extent to which they listen to me, or the extent of resources they deliver.
This may reflect an organizational 'settling-in' issue, as personnel learn to trust or otherwise (through experience). Alternatively, it may reflect a deeper structural problem inherent in bringing together partners with differing organizational cultures and functional domains.
Managing careers, rewards and risks
The third theme that stands out in the literature concerns the ways research personnel are influenced in their career decisions by working in a CRC. A large minority of respondents felt that CRC participation had enhanced their career prospects generally (F7), improved the way they worked with industry partners (F8) and provided a positive influence on redirecting their research (F9). Respondents were more equivocal about whether it had improved their prospects of internal promotion.
The HE group slightly disagreed that the CRC had enhanced their prospects for promotion within their university whereas the GR group felt that CRC involvement had slightly benefited their prospect of internal promotion. 
Conclusions
In the early stages of the program many CRCs were relatively loose networks, few were legally incorporated. The government now requires the incorporation of almost all CRCs which carries pressures to establish enduring organizational arrangements.
How CRC research personnel expect such arrangements to evolve and how they experience the process will be an important factor in determining their organizational durability.
As discussed earlier, previous research has suggested that the nature of the specific technology and commercial objectives of the collaborating partners tend to steer the strategic management approaches. This is also the case for CRCs in Australia. However, our interest has been to reveal more precisely why this is so. We propose that it is the nature of reward and risk for the research personnel and how they manage the balance that will determine the most effective management strategies.
We observe that the basic drivers of collaboration and the benefits reported by research personnel in the Australian CRC are likely to be common among other similar triple helix arrangements. Of the management issues that arise, some will be a feature of most cross-sector R&D organizations, some will pertain only to the specific arrangements in the Australian CRCs, and some will be restricted to individual CRCs and participant institutions. This is because the degree of homogeneity of goals for participant organizations, the factors affecting the acquisition of trust, and the career risks will vary from centre to centre. For some research staff career risks are greater if employed in some CRCs rather than others, or compared to employment in a traditional academic department. There is also some indication that participation in a CRC carries more of a personal career risk for university researchers than for government researchers. Ultimately it is resolving this sort of cost/benefit dilemma that drives strategic decisions.
The present study was not designed to explore causal relationships between the propositions addressed by our respondents nor the extent to which each may or may not have been formative in driving management strategies and organizational change. Rather, our concern was to draw attention to the expectations and experiences of CRC research personnel and reflect on how these might cement these triple helix structures as an enduring organizational form.
We find that one of the most valued aspects of CRC membership is the extension of research networks and access to new 'research users'. This leads us to support the validity of Dietz and Bozeman's (2005) (1) Excluding responses of 'not applicable' and missing values (2)
Responses were given values on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) through to 6 (Strongly Agree) There is too much competition between CRC staff and others at my institution.
